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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal involving bankruptcy law, we are asked to 
decide whether a franchise agreement involving a vehicle 
dealership had been terminated prior to the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition. Because we find that the franchise 
agreement was still in effect when the petition wasfiled, it 
follows a fortiori that the vehicle franchise was an asset of 
the bankruptcy estate. We further find that the post- 
petition adjudications by the state administrative board and 
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, effectively ordering 
the termination of the franchise agreement, were made in 
violation of the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. 
S 362(a)(3) and, thus, were not binding on the bankruptcy 
court. Accordingly, we will reverse the order of the district 




The resolution of the dispute before us turns, in large 
part, on certain events which occurred prior to the 
commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding. We reiterate 
the pertinent facts here. 
 
Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile-GMC Truck, Inc. ("Krystal 
Cadillac" or the "Debtor"), a licensed vehicle dealer in the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, owned and operated a 
GMC dealership in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.1 General 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The president of Krystal Cadillac Oldsmobile GMC Trucks, Inc., Harry 
Pappas, also owned and operated a Chrysler dealership at the same 
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Motors Corporation is a licensed vehicle manufacturer in 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the appellee in this 
consolidated appeal.2 
 
Krystal Cadillac operated the GMC dealership pursuant 
to the General Motors Corporation (Oldsmobile Division) 
Dealer Sales and Service Agreement, which went into effect 
on November 1, 1990. This franchise agreement was to 
remain in effect until October 31, 1995, unless terminated 
earlier and, as long as the dealer fulfilled its obligations 
under the franchise agreement, it was assured the 
opportunity to enter into a new dealer agreement at the 
expiration date.3 
 
In October of 1991, General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation withdrew its line of credit financing. 
Consequently, Krystal Cadillac found itself lacking the 
necessary financing to purchase new GM vehicles. To no 
avail, it made numerous attempts to obtain alternative 
financing. On March 6, 1992, GM notified Krystal Cadillac 
that it was in breach of the franchise agreement for failing 
to maintain a line of credit and for failing to purchase new 
vehicles. Based on the continued breach, GM gave notice 
on May 10, 1993 that the franchise would terminate in 
sixty days, that is, on July 13, 1993. At Krystal Cadillac's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
location under the name, "Krystal Jeep-Eagle, Inc." On January 13, 
1995, Krystal Jeep-Eagle filed a similar Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceeding in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania. 
 
2. Krystal Cadillac, with Lawrence V. Young, the Chapter 11 Trustee in 
Bankruptcy, filed separate appeals which we have consolidated 
(collectively referred to as the "Appellants"). 
 
3. We find that the franchise agreement did not expire by its own terms 
on October 31, 1995. At oral argument, counsel for the Debtor informed 
us that the October 31, 1995 date was viewed as a renewal date, rather 
than an expiration date, and therefore the franchise continued 
indefinitely until one of the parties gave written notification of 
termination. This unique arrangement was mandated because of the 
extremely valuable assets involved in maintaining a viable GMC 
dealership. Counsel for GM did not take issue with this assertion by the 
Debtor's counsel. 
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request, GM extended the termination date to August 12, 
1993.4 
 
On August 11, 1993, the day before the franchise 
agreement would have expired, Krystal Cadillac filed an 
appeal with the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicle 
Manufacturers, Dealers and Salespersons (the "Vehicle 
Board"), requesting a hearing on the merits of the 
termination. Approximately one year later, on August 2, 
1994, the Vehicle Board conducted a hearing to review the 
propriety of GM's notice of termination.5  Before the Vehicle 
Board rendered its determination, Krystal Cadillac filed a 
voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code on September 8, 1994. Thereafter, on 
September 27, 1994, the Vehicle Board entered an Order 
and Decision allowing GM to terminate the franchise 
agreement. Subsequently, Krystal Cadillac appealed the 
order of the Vehicle Board to the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court, which affirmed the Vehicle Board's 
decision on November 6, 1995. The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court denied Krystal Cadillac's petition for allowance of 
appeal. State Bd. of Vehicle Mfrs. v. Krystal Cadillac- 
Oldsmobile-GMC Truck, Inc., 676 A.2d 1203 (Pa. 1996). 
 
While this appeal was pending before the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court, the bankruptcy court appointed 
Lawrence V. Young as the Chapter 11 Trustee. The Trustee, 
in turn, filed a motion to sell the Debtor's assets, including 
the GM franchise, free and clear of liens and 
encumbrances. GM filed an objection to the Trustee's 
motion to sell, contending that the franchise agreement had 
been lawfully terminated and was not saleable or 
assignable. The Debtor also objected to the Trustee's 
motion to sell on the basis that it intended to file a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. According to Article 13.2 of the franchise agreement, Krystal Cadillac 
was entitled to ninety days notice, not sixty days as originally provided 
by GM. 
 
5. Initially, Krystal Cadillac and GM waived the 120-day requirement for 
setting a hearing date and instead stipulated to a general continuance. 
When notified of the August 2, 1994 hearing date, the Debtor requested 
an additional continuance which was denied. Nonetheless, Krystal 
Cadillac was represented by counsel at the hearing. 
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reorganization plan. On June 15, 1995, the bankruptcy 
court conducted a hearing on the proposed sale, at which 
time the court denied the Trustee's motion to sell. On that 
same date, the Debtor filed a Plan of Reorganization with 
the bankruptcy court, which provided for the sale of the 
GM franchise as a means to pay creditors. GM filed an 
objection to the Plan on July 10, 1995, arguing that since 
the franchise had been validly terminated in the state 
proceedings, the franchise was not an asset of the 
bankruptcy estate available for sale. The Debtor filed an 
amended reorganization plan on October 24, 1995, to 
which GM lodged the same objection. 
 
On December 27, 1995, the bankruptcy court entered an 
order which required the Debtor to file, on or before 
February 2, 1996, a motion to assume and assign the 
General Motors franchise and to provide to the Trustee with 
certain documentation to support such motion, including 
an unredacted copy of the agreement of sale between the 
Debtor and any potential purchaser, a copy of the transfer 
application, evidence to support the potential purchaser's 
financial abilities, and proof of the Debtor'sfinancial ability 
to consummate its Plan of Reorganization.6  In its attempt to 
comply with the court's December 27th order, the Debtor 
filed a timely motion to assume and assign the GMC 
dealership franchise, with documentation of itsfinancial 
position vis-a-vis the Plan of Reorganization. On March 14, 
1996, the Trustee filed a certification with the bankruptcy 
court, indicating that the Debtor had failed to comply with 
the terms of the court's December 27, 1995 order, and 
requesting that the case be converted to a Chapter 7 
proceeding. 
 
The bankruptcy court held a hearing on April 1, 1996, 
regarding the Debtor's compliance with the December 27th 
order and to consider the merits of the Debtor's motion to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In the event the Debtor failed to comply with the December 27th 
order, the bankruptcy court indicated it would enter an order dismissing 
the case or converting it to a Chapter 7 proceeding. The Trustee's motion 
to convert the case to a Chapter 7 proceeding, contingent upon the 
Debtor not performing certain requirements pursuant to its 
reorganization plan, was still outstanding at this time. 
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assume and assign the franchise. Subsequently, on April 
15, 1996, the bankruptcy court entered an order denying 
the Debtor's motion to assume and assign the franchise. 
The court reasoned that the decisions rendered in the state 
proceedings regarding the franchise termination precluded 
the bankruptcy court from authorizing a sale of the 
franchise. Both the Debtor and the Trustee filed motions for 
reconsideration of the bankruptcy court's April 15, 1996, 
order. In addition, the Trustee filed a motion to assume and 
to sell the franchise agreement to a qualified buyer for the 
price of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000), which 
GM opposed. 
 
On July 26, 1996, the bankruptcy court entered an order 
denying the motions for reconsideration and the Trustee's 
motion to sell the franchise agreement. The court held that 
the appeals to the Vehicle Board and to the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court clearly were filed by the Debtor and 
hence constituted an action by the Debtor, not against 
the Debtor. Since the automatic stay provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code applied only to actions against the 
Debtor, they did not apply to the state proceedings. 7 The 
court therefore concluded that the final termination of the 
franchise agreement occurred by operation of law as a 
result of the Vehicle Board's determination that GM had 
properly effected a termination prior to the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition. Based upon considerations of comity 
and finality, the bankruptcy court held that the findings of 
the Vehicle Board regarding the valid termination of the 
franchise agreement precluded it from ruling on the 
Debtor's ability to assume the franchise agreement since it 
is clear under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 
U.S.C. S 365, that a debtor cannot assume a validly 
terminated contract. 
 
The Debtor and the Trustee appealed the bankruptcy 
court's July 26, 1996, order to the district court on August 
5, 1996. The district court affirmed the order of the 
bankruptcy court on February 3, 1997, holding that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The court further opined that in order to prevent the state proceedings 
from going forward, the Debtor should have petitioned the court for an 
injunction under section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
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proceeding before the Vehicle Board did not fall within the 
scope of the automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. S 362 
and, therefore, the Vehicle Board's order allowing GM to 
terminate the franchise agreement was valid and the 
termination was effective. Accordingly, the district court 
held the franchise agreement was not an asset of the 
bankruptcy estate. The Debtor and the Trustee filed timely 
but separate appeals, which we consolidated for purposes 
of briefing and disposition. 
 
The bankruptcy court exercised its jurisdiction over this 
matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 157(b). The district court 
had jurisdiction to review the bankruptcy court's order 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 158(a). Our appellate jurisdiction 
over the district court's order rests upon 28 U.S.C. 
SS 158(d) and 1291. In undertaking our review, we stand in 
the shoes of the district court, applying a clearly erroneous 
standard to the bankruptcy court's findings of fact and a 
plenary standard to that court's legal conclusions. In re 
Siciliano, 13 F.3d 748, 750 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations 




The outcome of this appeal hinges on whether the 
franchise agreement should have been included as an asset 
of the bankruptcy estate. The filing of a voluntary petition 
for relief in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. S 301 creates 
an estate in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. S 541(a). Generally, the 
property of an estate in bankruptcy is comprised of all legal 
or equitable interests of the debtor in property on the date 
of commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding. 11 U.S.C. 
S 541(a)(1).8 If, in fact, the franchise agreement was still in 
force on the date Krystal Cadillac filed its bankruptcy 
petition, the franchise agreement, by statute, became an 
asset of the bankruptcy estate. In order to determine 
whether the franchise agreement was still in effect on 
August 11, 1993, the date Krystal Cadillac initiated this 
bankruptcy proceeding, we look to the express language of 
the agreement, as well as to the Pennsylvania Board of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The exceptions set forth in 11 U.S.C. SS 541(b) and (c)(2) to this 
general rule are inapplicable here. 
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Vehicles Act, Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 63, S 818.1 et seq. (West 
1996), governing transactions between vehicle 
manufacturers, dealers and salespersons. We turnfirst to 
the franchise agreement. 
 
In October 1990, the Debtor and GM executed the 
Oldsmobile Division Dealer Sales and Service Agreement 
("Oldsmobile Agreement"), which went into effect on 
November 1, 1990. Paragraph Eleven sets forth the term of 
the franchise agreement as follows: 
 
       This Agreement shall expire on October 31, 1995, or 
       ninety days after the death or incapacity of a Dealer 
       Operator or Dealer Owner, whichever occurs first, 
       unless earlier terminated. Dealer is assured the 
       opportunity to enter into a new Dealer Agreement with 
       Oldsmobile at the expiration date if Oldsmobile 
       determines Dealer has fulfilled its obligations under 
       this Agreement. 
 
The Oldsmobile Agreement further provided, in Paragraph 
Thirteen, for the incorporation of GM's Standard Provisions, 
Dealer Sales and Service Agreement (GMMS 1013) 
("Standard Provisions"), as part of the franchise agreement. 
Article 13 of the Standard Provisions addresses breaches 
and the remedy procedures. Where the breach has gone 
uncorrected, Article 13.1.13 provides: 
 
       If, however, Dealer's response does not demonstrate 
       that the breach has been corrected, or explain the 
       circumstances to [GM's] satisfaction, termination is 
       warranted and [GM] may terminate this Agreement 
       upon written notice to Dealer. Termination will be 
       effective 60 days following Dealer's receipt of the notice. 
 
Article 13.2, dealing with failure of performance by the 
dealer,9 provides that the dealer be given no less than six 
months to correct the failure. If the dealer does not correct 
the failure within the time allotted, Article 13.2 provides 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Failure of performance entails failure of the dealer to perform its 
sales 
or service responsibilities adequately, including those responsibilities 
relating to customer satisfaction and training. Standard Provisions, 
Article 13.2. 
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that GM may terminate the franchise agreement by giving 
the dealer ninety days advance written notice. 
 
Our inquiry does not end with an examination of the 
terms of the franchise agreement, however, since the 
agreement between the Debtor and GM is governed by the 
Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles Act, Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 63, 
S 818.1 et seq. (West 1996 & 1997 Supp.). The Act provides 
for the appointment of a Board of Vehicle Manufacturers, 
Dealers and Salespersons, which is empowered to regulate 
the licensing of vehicle salespersons, dealers and 
manufacturers, and "to adopt, promulgate and enforce such 
rules and regulations . . . as are deemed necessary and 
proper to effectuate the provisions of [the Act] . . .", among 
other things. Id. SS 818.4(1), (9). Under the Act as amended 
in 1996, section 818.13 sets forth the provisions governing 
termination of franchises.10 In particular, the Act states 
that any manufacturer who terminates or fails to renew the 
franchise of any vehicle dealer "unfairly, without due regard 
to the equities of said dealer and without just cause," has 
violated the Act. Id. S 818.13(a). Section 818.13(c) requires 
the manufacturer to give the dealer a minimum of sixty 
days advance notice of the termination or failure to renew 
the franchise agreement, although subsection (c) allows a 
shorter notice period in certain circumstances not present 
here. Id. S 818.13(c). Of particular relevance to this case is 
the subsection on appeals: 
 
       At any time before the effective date of such 
       termination or failure to renew, the dealer or 
       distributor may appeal to the board for a hearing on 
       the merits, and following due notice to all parties 
       concerned, such hearing shall be promptly held. No 
       such termination or failure to renew shall become 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. In 1996, the state legislature amended the Act by redesignating and 
rewriting section 818.9(c) as section 818.13. (Former section 818.13 
relating to the application for a license was renumbered as Pa. Stat. 
Ann., tit. 63, S 818.22 in the 1996 amendment.) The substance of 
section 818.9(c) has not been changed by the 1996 amendment, but 
rather, reorganized into subparts with appropriate headings. For ease of 
reference, we will refer to the pertinent portions of the amended section 
818.13. 
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       effective until final determination of the issue by the 
       board. 
 
Id. S 818.13(d) (emphasis added). Finally, in the event the 
dealer appeals the termination or failure to renew the 
franchise, section 818.13(e) provides that the manufacturer 
retains the burden of proving that just cause existed for 
such termination or failure to renew. Id. S 818.13(e). 
 
Reading the franchise agreement and the Act together, as 
we must, we conclude that the franchise agreement was not 
terminated, but rather, was in force on the date the Debtor 
filed the petition in bankruptcy. The Act makes clear that 
once a dealer has appealed the notice of termination, that 
termination shall not become effective until the Vehicle 
Board issues its decision. Indeed, counsel for GM conceded 
at oral argument that Krystal Cadillac retained a viable 
legal interest in the GM franchise at the time Krystal 
Cadillac filed a notice of appeal with the Vehicle Board. 
Moreover, the Vehicle Board had not rendered its decision 
as of the date of the bankruptcy filing on August 11, 1993. 
Accordingly, we find that termination of the franchise 
agreement had not been effectuated on August 11, 1993, 
and, therefore, that the franchise became an asset of the 




We further conclude that the subsequent determinations 
by the Vehicle Board and the Pennsylvania Commonwealth 
Court, effectively ordering the termination of the franchise 
agreement, were made in violation of the automatic stay 
provisions of 11 U.S.C. S 362(a) and, thus, were not binding 
on the bankruptcy court. Section 362(a) provides in 
relevant part: 
 
       (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of thi s 
       section, a petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 
       of this title, . . . operates as a stay, applicable to all 
       entities, of-- 
 
       (1) the commencement or continuation, including 
       the issuance or employment of process, of a 
       judicial, administrative, or other action or 
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       proceeding against the debtor that was or could 
       have been commenced before the commencement of 
       the case under this title, or to recover a claim 
       against the debtor that arose before the 
       commencement of the case under this title; 
 
       . . . . 
 
       (3) any act to obtain possession of property of th e 
       estate or of property from the estate or to exercise 
       control over property of the estate; 
 
11 U.S.C. SS 362(a)(1), (3).11 Subsection (b) of section 362 
enumerates specific exceptions to the automatic stay 
provisions, none of which applies here.12  11 U.S.C. S 362(b). 
The legislative history to section 362 and our jurisprudence 
leave no doubt that the scope of the automatic stay is 
broad. In re Atlantic Bus. and Community Corp., 901 F.2d 
325, 327 (3d Cir. 1990); Association of St. Croix 
Condominium Owners v. St. Croix Hotel Corp., 682 F.2d 
446, 448 (3d Cir. 1982). Explaining the purpose behind 
section 362, Congress has stated: 
 
       The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor 
       protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives 
       the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops 
       all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure 
       actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or 
       reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the 
       financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We noted in Borman v. Raymark Indus., Inc. that the estate property 
does not have to be in the debtor's possession for section 362(a)(3) to 
apply. 946 F.2d 1031, 1035 n.2 (3d Cir. 1991). We thus concluded that 
section 362(a)(3) applies to actions against third parties as well as 
actions against the debtor, unlike subsection (a)(1) which ordinarily 
stays 
only actions against the debtor. Id. (citation omitted). 
 
12. In its brief, GM argues that the continuation of the appeal before the 
Vehicle Board constituted an enforcement of the Board's police or 
regulatory power and thus fell within the exception to the automatic stay 
provided under 11 U.S.C. S 362(b)(4). We do not find merit to this 
argument. Clearly the proceeding before the Board was not commenced 
by the Board to enforce regulatory powers. Rather, the appeal was filed 
by the Debtor in response to GM's notice of termination. 
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       The automatic stay also provides creditor protection. 
       Without it, certain creditors would be able to pursue 
       their own remedies against the debtor's property. Those 
       who acted first would obtain payment of the claims in 
       preference to and to the detriment of other creditors. 
       Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly 
       liquidation procedure under which all creditors are 
       treated equally. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296. The broad 
reach of the automatic stay is further evidenced in the 
term, "property of the estate," as defined in 11 U.S.C. 
S 541(a). 
 
The Debtor maintains that the termination of the 
franchise is an act which resulted in GM taking possession 
of an asset of the bankruptcy estate and, therefore, was 
subject to the automatic stay provision in section 362(a)(3). 
We agree with the Debtor that section 362(a)(3) applies to 
the facts before us. GM's actions before the bankruptcy 
court, i.e., objecting to the Trustee's Motion to Sell the 
Debtor's Assets and the Motion to Assume and Assign as 
well as to the Debtor's Plan of Reorganization, on the basis 
that (1) the franchise agreement had been terminat ed and, 
thus, was not the Debtor's asset and (2) the state  court 
determination to that effect was binding on the bankruptcy 
court, constituted acts to take possession or control of 
property of the bankruptcy estate. 
 
We find support in In re Atlantic Bus. and Community 
Corp., 901 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1990). There we considered 
whether the debtor's possession of a tenancy at sufferance 
in a radio station and transmitter created a property 
interest as defined under section 541 and, as such, was 
protected by the automatic stay provision in section 
362(a)(3). Id. at 328. Informed by precedent in our sister 
circuits, In re 48th St. Steakhouse, Inc., 835 F.2d 427 (2d 
Cir. 1987), we concluded that a possessory interest in real 
property fell within the purview of the bankruptcy estate 
under section 541 and, therefore, was protected by the 
automatic stay provisions of section 362. 901 F.2d at 328. 
Thus we held the landlord's acts to evict the debtor and 
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dispossess it of its tenancy interest violated the automatic 
stay provision of section 362(a)(3). Id.13 
 
Like the landlord in Atlantic, GM undertook to dispossess 
the bankruptcy estate of one of its assets. The fact that 
Krystal Cadillac actually filed the notice of appeal to the 
Vehicle Board does not alter this result. What is dispositive 
here are the acts taken by GM after the bankruptcy petition 
was filed, after having learned that the Debtor intended to 
assign its interest in the GMC franchise as part of its 
reorganization plan. We can come to no other conclusion 
than that GM's actions before the Vehicle Board, the 
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, and the bankruptcy 
court were taken to obtain possession of the franchise 
agreement, which we find to be an asset of the bankruptcy 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. In arriving at its decision, the bankruptcy court relied on United 
States v. Inslaw, 932 F.2d 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1991). There the debtor 
attempted to resolve a contract dispute with the Justice Department by 
filing a complaint in the bankruptcy proceeding alleging a violation of 
the 
automatic stay provision. The court found that the debtor was trying to 
remedy pre-petition acts of fraud, bias or harassment allegedly on the 
part of the Justice Department by invoking the automatic stay 
provisions. Id. at 1474. Because section 362(a) applies only to acts taken 
after the petition is filed, the court held that the bankruptcy court 
lacked 
jurisdiction to resolve the contract dispute between Inslaw and the 
Justice Department. Id. at 1475. In dicta, however, the court opined that 
ensuring that the creditors do not destroy the bankruptcy estate in their 
scramble for relief does not mean that every party who resists the 
debtor's view of its rights violates section 362(a) if found in error by 
the 
bankruptcy court. Id. at 1473. The court therefore concluded that 
"someone defending a suit brought by the debtor does not risk violation 
of S 362(a)(3) by filing a motion to dismiss the suit, though his 
resistance 
may burden rights asserted by the [debtor]." Id. (citing Martin-Trigona v. 
Champion Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 892 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir. 
1989)). 
 
It is on this language that the bankruptcy court here relied in 
concluding that GM did not violate the automatic stay when it 
participated in the proceeding before the Vehicle Board. The bankruptcy 
court failed to recognize that, in both Inslaw and Martin-Trigona, the 
debtors were using the automatic stay provision to invoke the 
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over a non-core dispute. Here, the asset 
itself is at the core of the dispute. Accordingly, we find that Inslaw and 
Martin-Trigona are not relevant here. 
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estate. Accordingly, GM's acts to enforce the state court's 
termination of the franchise agreement and to obtain 
possession of the GMC franchise violated the automatic 




In sum, we find that Krystal Cadillac's property interest 
in a viable GMC franchise is an asset of the bankruptcy 
estate and that the Trustee is entitled to cure any defects, 
and to assume and assign the franchise for the benefit of 
all of the Debtor's creditors. Accordingly, we will reverse the 
judgment of the district court affirming the order of the 
bankruptcy court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 




14. Because we have concluded that the automatic stay provision of 
section 362(a)(3) was violated, we need not consider the Appellants' 
argument that the state proceedings were automatically stayed under 
section 362(a)(1). In addition, General Motors argues that we are bound 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1738 by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's 
decision regarding the applicability of the automatic stay provision. 
However, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held only that 11 
U.S.C. S 362(a)(1) did not apply because the proceeding before the 
Vehicle Board was commenced by, not against, the debtor. The 
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court did not decide whether 11 U.S.C. 
S 362(a)(3), on which we base our decision, applies. Thus, we need not 
and do not decide whether a decision of the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court on the applicability of 11 U.S.C. S 362(a)(3) would 
bind us. 
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